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A major problem, among others, that is confronted by
many countries all over the world is that of acquiring major
weapon systems. Some of them confront the problem from the
contractor's viewpoint, whose position is affirmative at
first but later on it may change due to unpredictable
reasons. Some others are faced with the main problem of how
to allocate their limited resources, relative to the
programs associated with the defense needs. A third problem
may arise from the lack of the necessary industrial facili-
ties to construct such systems. Finally other countries have
to solve the problem of the variety of the procedures that
are going to be implemented, since they have to rely upon
the contractor's rules and procedures, of building a major
system.
Greece is included among the above discussed countries.
Along with a growing economy, it has to incur large expendi-
tures for defense. The country is faced with the problem of
the domestic and foreign acquisition of major systems. It
has to take into account the lack of an industrial base and
therefore rely upon the foreign industry.
B. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH
The objective of this research is to develop a series of
recommended policies and procedures for improving the acqui-
sition process of the Greek Navy.
The first step is a review of the procedures that are
currently used by the D.S Department of Defense (DOD) in
acquiring a major weapon system. This review will include
the various phases that take place in the acquisition cycle.
A discussion of the major program milestones. Life Cycle
Cost (LCC) and the role of the program manager will be
included. Specific details below the level of the US
Department of Defense will not be analyzed, since the organ-
izational structures and procedures vary among the military
services.
The second step is a review of the existing acquisition
procedures in the Greek DOD. These procedures will be
described in the same way as the U. S ones.
In order to obtain first-hand information about the
acquisition process, the author, in addition to a literature
review, conducted personal interviews with officers and
civilians working in the NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND (NAVSEA)
and in the GREEK EMBASSY. The discusions included topics
that affect the acquisition process in the Navy, and the
specific duties and responsibilities of the program/project
manager.
C. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
In past years the capabilities of Greek industry were
limited to ship repairs, the construction of some minor
weapon systems, or the installation of systems which were
bought from the US cr other countries (France, Norway,
Belgium, W.Germany, Netherlands). The cost of the procure-
ments, installations and alterations was high because of the
higher GNP, personal income, and wage rates of these coun-
tries. Likewise, the profit level was higher for foreign
industries than it would have been for the domestic indus-
tries. Since 1978, Fast Patrol Boats (FPBs) based on French
designs have been constructed in Greek Shipyards. These FPBs
remain in good operational condition, even though these were
the first constructed by Greek technicians.
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The major problem in obtaining a larger share of the
defense dollar for Greek industry is the lack of the appro-
priate industrial base of acquiring major weapon systems, in
comparison with the U.S. industrial base that the U.S. Navy
uses for the same purpose.
This is one side of the coin. The other is that Greece
spends a lot of money every year on defense requirements.
Figure 1.1 contains numerical data that show these data.
Greece spends a greater proportion of its GDP for defense
than any other country in the NATO Alliance. It also has to
be mentioned that the figures shown for European NATO coun-
tries do not include the value of end-items received under
military aid programs from the United States and Canada
[Ref. 1].
Figure 1.2 shows the total defense expenditures of NATO
countries since 1949. Greece had the third highest expendi-
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In figure 1.3 it is shown that
$26 5/year/head for defense expenditures.
the Greeks £ay
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finally, in figure 1.4 it can be seen that Greece is
first among the NATO countries as far as the total armed
forces as a percentage of total labor force, with a propor-
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From the above discussion the problem becomes apparent.
It consists of two parts.
The first is the lack of an established industrial base
for domestic procurement of major systems for the DOD and
especially for the Navy. This problem exists despite the
fact that scientific personnel have the necessary technical
knowledge to support the required industrial base.
The second is that the country is forced to suffer large
defense expenditures which dc not benefit the domestic
economy. These defense expenditures go to foreign countries
instead of going to domestic industry. In addition, there is
a dependence on foreign industry to support the national
defense.
D. SCCPE OF THE THESIS
This thesis will address the above two problems
confronting Greece. An attempt will be made to develop a
proposed policy/plan for the acquisition process that could
be used by the Greek Navy.
The second chapter indicates data for the Greece and its
Economy
.
The third chapter describes the Greek DOD and Navy.
In the fourth chapter a description is given for the
procedures of the acquisition process used by the U.S. Navy.
The fifth chapter analyses the system management and its
cost.
The sixth chapter describes all the procedures that are
used by the Greek Navy for the purpose of acquiring major
weapon systems.
The seventh chapter analyses the contracting procedures
in the Greek Navy.
The eighth chapter presents similarities and differences
between the U.S. Navy and the Greek Navy for the acquisition
process to be described.
22
The nineth chapter covers the proposed policy/plan for
the Greek Navy as far as the acquisition process.
Finally, in the last chapter conclusions and recommenda-
tions have been included.
23
II. GREECE AND ITS ECONOMY
Greece is a small country located in the southeast
corner of Europe and has an ancient civilization of more
than 4,000 years. Many strategic and political changes have
been made during its long history.
The country occupies a path that connects three conti-
nents (Europe-Asia-Africa) . The countries sharing boundaries
with Greece have different social and economic systems. On
the northern boundary there are Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and
Albania, and to the east there is Turkey. The other sides
are surrounded by the Mediterranean Sea.
Some numerical data are listed below:
• Population: 9,740,417 (census 1981),
• Area: 131,990 sg. km.
• Islands: 202.
• Eock-islands: 2,898.
• Length of coasts: 15,021 km.
Greece became a member of the NATO Alliance in October
1951, after 5 years of occupation by the Germans and 4 years
of civil war.
A. ECONOMIC CONDITIO!!
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita for the year
1983 was estimated to be $3,752 and the defense expenditures
as a percentage of GDP in purchases values for the year
1983, were estimated to be 7.1 percent [Ref. 1 ].
The increase in the Gross National Product of Greece is
predicted to fluctuate between 0.4 and 1.3 percent in 1984.
The Gross National Income prediction fluctuates between 0.0
and 1.0 percent, the available National Sources between 0.4
24
and 1.4 percent, and the National Expenditures between 0.4
and 1.4 percent [Eef. 28]-
The Greek economy had rapid growth until fiscal year
1973. At that time an economic crisis happened that lasted
one year. During the following four years, from 1975 to
1979, economic growth continued hut the rate at which it was
growing was characterized by a stable small pace until 19 81.
Precisely, the unemployment rate for the year 1983 was
9.0, for 1982 7.2, and for 1981 5.5 percent. Inflation
remains at an unusual high rate. A 20 percent rate is higher
than that commonly existing in European Countries. Ihe
capital inflow and the non-capital receipts (foreign travel,
transportation, unreguired transfers, interests, dividends,
profits, official services, miscellaneous services) for the
years 1980 through 1982 were $9, 145.70m, 12,383.90m and
11,872m correspondingly. On the other hand the capital
outflow plus the invisible payments were $2, 240. 90m,
5,839.50m and 6,362.10m correspondingly [Ref. 29].
Figure 2.1 shows the developments in liquid assets
during the years 198 1-82-83, from which the result is that
from January 1981 to December 1983 the savings deposits
increased by 118 percent. [Eef. 30].
Figure 2.2 shows the total credit to the economy by
sector of economic activity. On the vertical axis the money
is measured in billions of drachmae and on the horizontal
axis the months and the years are measured. The manufac-
turing industry had an increase in credit of 92.70 percent.
From this figure it also can be seen at what level the
country credits the manufacturing activity.
1 • Ificen tives
Incentives to support the country's regional and
economic development and amendment of provisions incidental
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MONEY AND BANKING
3 IYNOAIKH XPHMATOAOTHZH THE OIKONOMIAI KATA KAAAOYI
TOTAL CREDIT TO THE ECONOMY BY SECTOR OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY





Figure 2.2 Total Credit to the Economy
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legislation as amended and supplemented by the Law 1360/1983
[Ref. 31].
These two laws state that productive investment is
defined as the purchase of new machinery and other mechan-
ical or technical production equipment and the purchase of
new electronic computers and other data-processing or auto-
mation systems.
In the above category are also included the cost of
investment in the importation, development and application
of modern technology, the cost of installation of a model
test unit, and the investment ccsts for applied research and
purchase of laboratory instruments or equipment for applied
research in industry or mining.
Finally the productive investment is applied in
moving expenses for the relocation of existing productive
units to less-developed areas or within the same area but in
an industrial or handicraft zone.
The business enterprises included for the purpose of
acquiring the privileges of the existing legislation are
farming, mining, technical aid centers, manufacturing and
others providing services.
B. COUNTRY'S AREAS FOR INVESTMENTS
To promote regional developnent and economic decentrali-
zation, the territory of Greece is divided into four wide
development areas. Each of these areas includes provinces
and districts. Since about 50 percent of the Greek popula-
tion lives in the capital and the surrounding suburbs, the
government established incentives trying to encourage
industry to locate their activities in different regions
rather than concentrating near Athens.
28
1 • The Four Areas
Among the four areas (A,3,C and D) in which the
country has established incentives, emphasis is placed on
area D which is located near the Northern borders of Greece
and in some islands. For the purpose of promoting private
investments, the following grants are made available by the
State, in the form of capital aid:
• For investments up to 400m drachmae the grant is given
free to cover part of the investment cost.
• For investments from 400M to 600M drachmae inclusive
and for the amount exceeding 400M drachmae, 50 percent
of the grant is given free to cover part of the invest-
ment cost and 50 percent in the form of public partici-
pation in the capital of the company, which is either a
private limited company (LLC) or a public limited
company (SA)
.
• For investments over 600m drachmae the grant is
entirely in the form of public participation in the
capital of the investing company.
Enterprises are required to accept public participa-
tion and have the option of qualifying for the benefits of
this law. This situation takes place only for part of the
investment up to 400M drachmae or, when they accept public
participation by 50 percent, for part of the investment from
400 to 600M, keeping however a minimum of private participa-
tion in the total investment. The above mentioned amounts
may be readjusted by decision of the Minister of National
Economy, published in the Government Gazette. To determine
the limit of 400 million drachmae, the total level of the
investment program will be taken into consideration.
In table 1 the grant and own participation rates are
included. This table indicates the four areas in which the
country is separated for matters pertaining to investments
and grants for the purpose of encouraging the manufacturers
to locate their activities in the regional areas.
TABLE 1
Grant and Own Participation Rates
Area Grant Cwn participation (minimum)
A up to 303 (only for 30% (only for
special special
investments) investments)
/CB 10% to 2 57c
C 1555 to 405? 25%
D 20% to 5 0% 15%
35% to 50% (only in the
special zones)
Special zones presenting an acute development
problem in relation to the rest of the area may be desig-
nated in each subsidized area by Ministerial Decision. On
the other side certain investments that are of particular
concern to the Greek economy are classified under the
category of special investments, and include, among others,
the production of goods and services of highly advanced
technology. In addition, these investments include the
establishment or extension of laboratories for applied
industrial, mining, and other research.
To fix the total level of the investment program,
the aggregate of all investment programs referring to the
same production process will be examined. This level will be
fixed if these programs are submitted by the same investor
for qualification for the benefits of the provisions of this
law. The qualification must be submitted within a period of
30
up to 5 years from the completion of the investment. This
refers to the same production process and has already been
submitted to the provisions of the law 1262/1982.
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III. STRUCTURE OF THE GREEK DOD AND NAVY
A. FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE GREEK DOD
The Greek DOD operates under law 660/1977, that is based
upon article #45 of the country's constitution of 1975. This
law specifies the structure of YETHA (Ministry of National
Defense), GEETHA (General Staff of National Defense) and of
the three cilitary tranches, GES (General Staff of Army),
GEN (General Staff of Navy) and SEA (General Staff of Air
Force)
.
The command of the above branches [Ref. 15], rests upon
basic principles established by the French manufacturer
HENRI FAYOL in 1916. These principles are:
• Labor division
• Authority and Responsibility
• Discipline
• Chain of Command
• Unity of Command
• Initiative
• Common sense
According to this article of the Greece's constitution
"The President of the Republic commands the Armed Forces of
the Country through the Government, which approves and
assigns ranks to military personnel, of all the services".
Law 660/1977 states that the responsibility for the
National Defense (ND) rests upon the Government, which
establishes the general policies and their implementation.
For the purpose of carrying out all of its defense
duties, the Government is assisted by the KYSEA, named the
"Governmental Council of National Defense".
32
B. GOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (KYSEA)
The Council has the following duties:
• Hakes all the decisions pertaining to ND
• Forms ND policies
• Introduces to the President of the Republic the decla-
ration or raising of the state of general mobilization
and the proclamation of war
• Determines the declaration or raising of the alert and
also the country's mobilization
• Appoints the Chief of GEETHA (A/GEETHA) , and the Chiefs
of the other military tranches and the Corps of
National Security
• Selects the Array Commanders, the Chief of the Tactical
Air Force and the Vice Generals of GEETHA
All of KYSEA's decisions are sent to the Defence
Minister (DEM) , and also to other ministries as applicable.
The Ministries have the responsibility for implementing the
rules established by the KYSEA, by issuing detailed proce-
dures. In some cases ministries may suggest proposed changes
to the law, for the purpose of implementing their policies.
The DEM similar to the Secretary of Defence (SECDEF) of
US, is responsible to the Government for the command and
control of the ND, for the purpose of establishing in this
field all the procedures and rules that are expressed by the
Parliament. Also, he is the supervisor of each branch of the
ND, assisted in his duties by the Chiefs of GSS , GEN, GEA
and finally by the Chief of GEETHA (A/GEETHA) in cases
reguiring their coordination. In addition to the control
and coordination of ND the DEM carries out other duties such
as:
• Planning the Public National Defense and establishing
requirements for development programs for the benefit
Of ND
3.3
• Organizing the structure, tolicies and procedures of ND
• Managing decisions that affect generally topics in the
ND area
• Determining manning levels for each branch of ND
Figure 3.1 shows the structure of the DOD.
C. GENEEAI STAFF OF NAVY (GEN)
The A/GEN, is an officer elected by the KYSEA. The nomi-
nation is submitted to the DEM, and he submits this decision
to the President. Finally, a Presidential decree ratifies
this election. On appointment of the A/GEN the following
authorities and responsibilities are assumed:
• He is a consultant of the DEM and responsible to him
for matters pertaining to the Navy, such as correct
organization, distribution of personnel, preparation
for war, and readiness
• He is the president of the Supreme Council of the Navy
and has a vote in the Ccuncil of Chiefs of General
Staff
• He recommends to the DEM everything strictly related to
the Navy which needs to be covered and established by
law or other regulative decree
• He has the authority to make decisions affecting the
formation of Navy units and services, as long as this
action does not change the manning level of the Navy
• He recommends to the DEM the appointment of Navy flag
officers and generally has authority as specified in
Greek legislation
Figure 3.2 shows the structure of the Navy, providing a
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IV. ACQUISITION MNAGE ME NT PROCESSES IN U.S. NAVI
A. CONCEPT OF THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
The System Acquisition Process means the establishment
of a sequence of acquisition activities, that start from the
agency's reconciliation of its nission needs, with its capa-
bilities, priorities and resources, and are extended through
the introduction of a system into operational use or the
otherwise successful achievement of program objectives
[Ref. 2],
Major system acquisition programs are those programs
that are first, directed at and critical to fulfilling an
agency mission, second, entail the allocation of relatively
large resources, and third, warrant special management
attention.
Additional criteria and relative dollar value thresholds
for the determination of agency programs to be considered as
major systems under the purview of the 0M3 Circular A- 109
may be established at the discretion of the agency head
[Ref. 2].
Circular A-109 represents a general concept that focuses
its attention in written rules, procedures, and policies as
they have been established since April 5, 1976. All the
above provisions must be followed by the executive agencies
of the Federal Government for the purpose of improving the
process of acquiring major systems.
Circular A-109 covers the nanagement of the acquisition
of major systems including the analysis of agency missions,
the determination of mission needs, the setting of program
objectives, the determination cf system requirements. Also
the system program planning, funding, research, engineering,
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development, testing, and evaluation are included. In addi-
tion to the above procedures, contracting, production,
program and management control and the introduction into use
are applied, through which management could achieve the
program objectives.
All programs for the acguisition of major systems must
be implemented even though the system is one-of-a-kind. In
figure 4.1 the major systems acguisition cycle is indicated.
B. IBPLEMEBTATION
Circular A-109 follows the policies implemented by the
Circular A-76 which places reliance on the private sector
for goods and services. It places emphasis on Congressional
and executive leadership at the front end of the systems
acguisition cycle. The decisiors associated with the tech-
nical and program procedures depend upon the participating
parties, the agency, and the operating/activity level.
Circular A-109 states that the decision maker (SECDEF) has
to implement the following primary decisions:
• To identify and define the specific mission, opera-
tional requirements that have to be addressed, the
appropriate priorities within the agency, and the
appropriate amount of funds to be invested (Milestone
0)
• To select competitive concepts for the system being
designed, to establish and evaluate the criteria for
test and evaluation, and to have the authority to
construct and develop the concept into a single system
(Milestone I)
• Commitment of a system tc full-scale development and
limited production (Milestone II)
• Commitment of a system to production (milestone III)
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3y the implementation of the circular A-109 policy many
benefits could be expected, such as:
• Opportunities available to a wide spectrum of national
industries to participate in government contracts in
order to encourage industry
• Facilitate the exchange of information between agencies
and Congress, by communication for the purpose of
agreement with the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
This act requires refcom 33 the President to submit his
budget in January, 15 days after Congress convenes.
This act also provides the guidelines for Congressional
enactment
• Decrease cost overruns
• Acquisition of major systems by the agencies would be a
common process which would still be flexible enough to
meet unique needs
By implementing these policies a large amount of money
could be saved by avoiding program start-ups. Because these
programs could be cancelled later on when it would be real-
ized that the need did not exist, or other programs were
given a higher priority, or the proposed program was able to
be satisfied by other with less cost. [Ref. 4].
C. CIRCULAR A-76
As noted above A-109 relies on the participation of
private industry in accordance \*ith the policies established
by the circular A-76.
Circular Ho A-76 was issued by the Bureau of the Budget
in the 1966. Its expressed policy was an affirmation cf the
Government's general policy of relying upon private industry
for non-governmental activities. An exception may be made in
cases where the Government, after weighing the national
interest, acquires the capability to produce systems and
services it needs directly.
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This policy was unchanged until the year 1979, when
Circular A-76 was revised in CMB to include three guiding
principles.
1 • Government- Private Sector
The Government must rely on the capabilities of
private industry. It has to focus its attention on the
private sector in order that its resources be exploited. The
Government may sign contracts with commercial companies to
satisfy its needs. All these actions are necessary for the
purpose of acquiring its systems and services, because the
government must avoid competition with the private sector.
2- Cost Reduction
Much effort will be given to controlling the various
costs concerned. This means that when the systems
constructed by industry meet the desired performance parame-
ters, there will still be concerns about how to reduce the
cost and society will require a detailed examination of the
various factors that have been involved in the total cost,
for the purpose of acquiring the most economical system.
3 . Cost Minimization
The third principle consists of the strong relation-
ship between in-house governmental capabilities and the
related public interest to minimize the cost.
D. PPBS CONCEPT
From the early part of the 20th century until 1940, the
budget process had the purpose of controlling actual expen-
ditures.
Prom 1940 to 1950 the concept changed and it shifted to
justifying the budget estimation by more advanced and
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sophisticated measurement of the effectiveness of the
system.
Before the implementation cf PP5S, the control of the
acquisition process was a function of financial control.
That is, a service could start as many programs as it could
afford, and priorities were a matter of management opinion
rather than a high level planning process. There were
disadvantages in the whole process because:
• The rotation of personnel resulted in the reduction of
the scope or changing of the objectives established by
the previous responsible individuals
• There were contradictions because the enthusiasm of the
personnel of the service to start as many programs as
could be possible was not in agreement with the public
and the Congress
Due to the above two described reasons, and in addition
because the appropriations used were made annually (Congress
could reduce these programs), the result was a lack of an
available means by which the continuity from year to year
for a plan or objective of a service could be assured.
SECDEF McNamara started an approach to program budgeting
by introducing the planning-pr cgramming cycle. This cycle
included programs which were reguired by the services rela-
tive to the national strategy. That is, programs would be
funded based on their priority in terms of the national
strategy. As the need was quantified, the next step was the
development of the maximum cost effectiveness procedure, in
order that the available funds to be acquired.
Charles J. Hitch developed and installed the PPBS
concept which represents the bridge connecting the functions
planning and budgeting shown in figure 4.2 [Ref. 6]-
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E. SYSTEM ACQUISITION IN THE U.S. NAVY
The basic mission of Navy system acquisition is to carry
out effectively and efficiently all the programs needed in
order to achieve the required operational objectives.
These acquisitions will be managed in an adequate and
appropriate way after the implementation of the following
principles [Ref. 7].
• Elimination of superfluous program reviews and require-
ments for documentation and the establishment of a
schedule of review milestones in such a manner as to
allow smooth transition between the acquisition phases
• Establishment of an organization that minimizes the
span of control for program review, while maintaining
adequate control of the overall acquisition process
• I irplementation of a strong relationship between PP3S
priority and personal decisions associated with the
program being built and controlling the growth of the
cost among the programs
• Consideration of all necessary internal and external
program elements such as the required personnel,
training and logistic support, for the purpose of
establishing and following an acquisition strategy
• Procedures such as development of improved long range
plans, cost estimates, realistic budget and economical
production rates will lead to increased program
stability
• Improvement of productivity by building well-balanced
trade-offs between LCC and system effectiveness
• Strengthen the industrial base
F. BIIESTONES AND PROGRAM PHASES GENERALLY
There is a clear distinction between the various acqui-
sition phases that are required of all major systems,
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leading up to their procurement. The phases related to the
milestones are indicated below
1
.
Mission Need Determi nation (MND) or Program
Initiation.
Based on a justification for a new start, the
program initiation is completed in the PPBS process.
Approval of a program gives the authority to proceed into
phase O-Concept Exploration. Pclicy requires that alterna-
tive system concepts be compared and evaluated to pick the
best solution to the mission need. The Military Service is
in a position to proceed into this phase when it has the
SECDEF approval of its budget.
2- Milestone I
This decision represents a validation and approval
of the alternative solutions that have been selected and a
determination as to whether or not to enter into the next
phase, after an extensive study of costs, readiness, objec-
tives, and af fordability.
3 • Milestone II
In this stage the SECEEF's approval is given to
proceed with the Full-Scale-Development phase. This approval
means that the SECDEF intends to deploy the system. In this
phase operational tests and evaluation take place on devel-
opment models and/or limited production units.
4. Milestone III
Finally this decision includes the approval by the
SECDEF for the program to proceed into phase III. This
phase, Production and Deployment, begins with the approval
for production and extends through the period in which the
major system is introduced into operational use.
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In figure 4.3 the whcle acquisition process is
summarized, including all the milestone decisions [Bef. 8 ]-
G. AHA1YTICAL APPROACH TO MILESTONES
1 • mission Need Determination
For the purpose of initiating a new acquisition
program there are two basic requirements: Mission Need
Determination and Allocation of Funds.
The various organizations of the Navy conduct
mission analyses which are submitted to the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV). This submission, based on
the described mission analyses, helps OPNAV to identify the
element needs and to evaluate the existing systems,
regarding their capabilities and deficiencies.
In addition to that, a possibility may exist to
increase the capability of major systems or to replace them
with less costly and more effective alternatives, when the
relative opportunities are available.
The basic required document that is used by the
Department of the Navy (DON) is the Justification of Major
System New Start (JMSNS)
.
The DOD component requires a JMSNS for all new
starts where it predicts that the money to be spent is:
• More than $200 million for RDT&2, or
• Production- more than $1 billion in production, or
• The SECDEF characterizes the new system as "major"
On the other side, JMSNS is not required for tech-
nology base programs, regardless of tne required size. These
programs include all the necessary laboratories, elements
and tools through which the advanced knowledge could be
discovered and implemented. Also included is the expansion
of the existing bases necessary to accept the updated
improvements in technology. The requirement of a JMSNS is
indicated in figure 4.4.
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The JMSNS is to be submitted by the OPNAV to the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) . If the proposed JMSNS is
approved by the CNO, OPNAV attaches this to the budget
request, through which programming subject to the
constraints of the fiscal year is implemented. This instru-
ment is called the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) and
represents a comprehensive and detailed expression of the
total resource requirements associated with the total
commitment of each DOD component. The development of each
POM follows specific details that are implemented on an
annual basis.
OPNAV then submits the proposed POM to the Secretary
of the Navy (SECNAV) for review and approval, and in the
case of new starts the approval constitutes the Navy's
mission need determination decision and recommends the
program to enter into the Concept Exploration phase.
Finally, the POM is submitted to the SECDEF for
review and approval. In this situation SECDEF's answer is
included in the Program Decision Memorandum (?DM) . After
his approval it is included in the DOD Budget and so the
permission has been given for the program to begin the
Concept Exploration Phase, as it can be seen in figure 4.5.
2 . Concept Exploration Pha se and Mi le stone I
The overall purpose of this phase is the selection
of one or more competitive approaches to meet the mission
requirements. Its major concerns are performance, cost,
schedule, supportability, and standardization. During this
phase proposals are requested, evaluated and reviewed,
trade-offs are considered. Two significant activities occur.
The assignment of a Program Manager (PM) and the formulation
of the acquisition strategy [Ref. 9].
Finally, the concepts that best meet the mission
requirements are selected and recommended for SECNAV and
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SECDEF approval. Test and evaluation plans are made as
early as it is possible and practicable. The Decision
Coordinating Paper (DCP) represents the principal document
in this phase. Its purpose is to support the Defense System
Acquisition Review Council (DSAEC) reviews for SECDEF deci-
sion milestone I [Ref. 11]. Figures 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9 show
all the high level personnel involved in decisions affecting
the major system acquisition.
3. Demonstration and Validation Phase and Milestone II
When the approval of the SECDEF has been given and
documented in the Secretary of Defense Decision Memorandum
the DON proceeds into the phase I, Demonstration and
Validation, where selected alternatives are refined through
extensive study and analyses, hardware development, and test
and evaluation. The object is to validate the selected solu-
tion (s) and provide the basis f cr determining whether or not
to proceed into the next phase. Figure 4.10 shows the
Demonstration and Validation phase including all the
required procedures. The main objective of the demonstra-
tion and validation phase is the identification of the
concept that has the greatest potential to meet the mission
need, in a cost effective manner. The Program Manager is
responsible for making trade-off decisions [fief. 12].
The SECNAV confirms the mission needs, and if neces-
sary the threat is updated. In order to achieve the most
effective balance in cost, performance and schedule, neces-
sary trade-offs are made including operational, logistics
and energy considerations. Also determination is made, as to
whether the selected system satisfies the mission element
needs, it is cost effective and the stated constraints can
be established. The risks that are involved in the demon-
stration and validation phase, are consistent with major
elements such as cost, performance and schedule estimates.
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Among the others, these elements have to be thoroughly
reviewed and well defined. The recommendations that have
been suggested, are supported by the completed demonstration
and validation tests. Other characteristics in this phase
are the requirements for long-lead procurement items and
possibly initial production, fcr the purpose of supporting
the operational test and evaluation needs, verifying the
production engineering, and establishing the appropriate
production base [Eef. 10].
To achieve the above results, the contractors are
required to submit their finis' proposals. The dollar
threshold can not be exceeded to carry the program into the
next phase. The Under Secretery of Defense for Research and
Engineering (USDRSE) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(ASD) , monitor the demonstration and validation phase and in
the case of exceeding the program dollar threshold, it has
to be reviewed critically.
Finally two documents are used, the DCP that is
updated to reflect the progress made during this phase, and
the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) , through which
the documentation, identification, and integration of the
testing and evaluation is accomplished prior to milestone II
and III program decisions.
After the completion of the demonstration and vali-
dation activity, the decision as to what is the preferable
system to be selected rests upon the SECDEF. He selects the
system to proceed into the full- scale development phase.
For this reason, he conducts the DSARC's review. The
DSARC's review and consideration is based on two documents,
that have different concepts and include different levels of
details. Precisely the DCP represents a top-level document,
that summarizes the identification of a series of concepts,
such as alternatives, goals, thresholds, and threshold
ranges. On the other hand, the Integrated Program Summary
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(IPS) contains more specific information on the program.
When the DCP does not provide enough information for the
decision, then an IPS is required for the milestone II deci-
sion. This fact is considered by the Defense Acquisition
Executive (DAE) [Bef. 13].
The SDDM documents the SECDEF»s decision for the
program to proceed into the full-scale development phase,
after his favorable reaffirmation of the mission needs.
**• ZuiizScale Development and Milestone III
During this phase considerations take place about
the reestablishment and the updating of the threat, associ-
ated with the mission element need. Also the acquisition
strategy has been updated and is being executed and
supported by business planning. Business planning includes
provisions for flexibility in production rates and the
appropriate quantities for different options. Major consid-
erations are refined including acceptable and realistic cost
and schedule estimates. Affordafcility and system cost effec-
tiveness remain major considerations. Major program problems
have been resolved. The fiscal year thresholds have been
examined and the appropriate reaffirmation has been made,
while the necessary balance between cost, performance and
schedule has been maintained through effective tradeoffs.
Four other factors that are prerequisites for the program to
enter into the production and deployment phase are logis-
tics, operational considerations, manpower and training. The
program manager is supported in his duties and responsibili-
ties, and a review of production readiness is completed.
This readiness means that the contractor is familiar with
the program as it has been designed, its required quanti-
ties, and hence he has the necessary capability to build it
[Ref. 10]. In figure 4.11 the Full-Scale Development phase
is indicated.
iiS
As a summary description of all the above actions,
the system in this phase is fully developed, engineered,
fabricated, tested, and a decision rendered on its accept-
ability for entering the Navy's inventory. Concurrently,
nonraaterial aspects required to field an integrated system
are developed, refined and finalized. [Ref. 14].
The third and final nilestone decision point is
referred to as the production decision and the subseguent
deployment as it is shown in figure 4.12.
In many cases a comprehensive view of the major
program rests upon the lowest level in an organization, so
it is possible in certain cases the decision authority may
be delegated for the milestone III decision. Normally this
decision is given by the SECDEF, but this may be given for
Navy programs to the SECNAV. This authority is not given to
the SECNAV, when thresholds established in milestone II have
been breached.
In order for a major program to enter into the
production and deployment phase, a recommendation needs to
be made by the service secretary to the SECDEF, based on the
progress of the program. The content of what has to be done
is summarized in the DCP, that has to be updated with latest
briefings affecting the program. The DCP is reviewed by the
DSARC III group, which represents the top level DOD corpo-
rate body for system acquisition, and provides advice and
assistance to the SECDEF [Ref. 9].
Although the major program is going to reach its
final stage before being provided and accepted by the opera-
tional forces, the SECDEF makes a reaffirmation on mission
need. If the reaffirmation is favorable, then his approval
provides the "green light" and the program can enter the
last phase. A quantity of the system will be produced to
meet the operational aspects of the service. Besides,
production items are examined under more intensive and
extensive operational tests and evaluation.
4 9.
The service secretary is aware for every stage in
this phase, affecting the program, because he has the
authorities such as:
• Submits quarterly reports to the SECDEF on key program
issues
• Desides the time, in which the system is ready and so
it can be deployed to the using activity and finally to
give his advice to the SECEEF. In addition to that, the
DAE and the OSD are kept informed of the progress of
the program, by the service staff
5 . Production and Dep_loy_me nt Phase
Generally speaking in this phase operational units
are trained, equipment is procured and distributed, and
logistic logistic support provided. The preplanned product
improvements are applied to the equipment as required
[Eef. 14].
The production and deployment phase includes the
activities between the production approval decision and the
delivery of the last system to the active forces.
For the purpose of summarizing all the above mile-
stones, acquisition phases, and the required documentation,
figure 4.13 is attached [Ref- 16].
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Figure 4. 13 DOD Acquisition Improvement Program
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V. SYSTEM MANAGEMENT ANE COST IN THE US NAVY
A. PB0GRAM/PR0J2CT MANAGER
Program Management is the maintenance of a balance among
technical and operational resources, and business and finan-
cial management resources to provide an affordable end
product suitable for the fleet to perform its mission. The
business and financial management disciplines weigh heavily
in the decision making process. The necessity for business
discipline in systems acguisiticn is provided through busi-
ness expertise to the Program Manager [Ref. 17].
In other words Program Management represents a concept
due to which an individual is chartered (officer or
civilian) to whom authority and responsibility is given, in
order to carry out the planning, directing, controlling and
accounting for an approved project [Ref. 6].
The PM is usually assigned after the mission need deter-
mination decision, and during the concept exploration phase.
But there are exceptions. That is he may be be assigned
prior to the above decision, especially when the urgency or
the magnitude of an anticipated effort warrants
The PM f s charter is approved by SECNAV in the case of
major systems. He has to operate under this charter, and to
take into account major factors such as, approved
performance/schedule constraints, and thresholds and funding
constraints for the purpose of conducting the program within
those factors.
In the real world he does not always operate under the
charter. Sometimes he is faced with unusual conditions
either from the contractor's point of view or from his
workers [Ref- 18].
Some characteristics are strictly related to the concept
surrounding the PM. He has to have a thorough understanding
64
of the environment he works in. Also he has to have the
ability to rapidly adjust a whole organization to program
changes. From his responsibilities, he has prerogatives that
can be used in the whole procedure of constructing a major
system. These prerogatives include the technical control of
the program, the approval of specifications for the major
system, approval of the subcontractor's plans, technical
guidance as far as the selection of subcontractors, and
finally the approval of change proposals that affect the
contract.
The PM reports directly to the SYSCOM or NAVMAT or in
some instances via the Project Director. In any case there
are no more than two levels between the PM and the super-
visor to whom he reports.
DODI 5000-2 defines an acquisition strategy as the
conceptual basis for the PM ' s overall plan for program
execution and requires its generation as soon as it is
possible after milestone 0. The scope of this action (early
planning) aims at providing the overall direction to the
acquisition effort. Because of the complexity inherent in
establishing the various goals and objectives related to the
acquisition effort, the PM must essentially consider what
has to be done in order to establish the proper assurances
that the acquisition will be successful. In these great
responsibilities the PM is supported in his effort by the
contracting officer. The distinction between them is that,
while the PM is responsible for the overall acquisition
planning, the contracting officer must coordinate, develop
and maintain the formal acquisition plan itself [Bef. 19].
Figure 5.1 shows the relationship of these two participants
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B. TEE SYSTEM'S LIFE CYCLE COST (LCC)
Every major weapon system is designed to be useful,
sufficient and effective over a specified period of time. It
must satisfy the need. Also it must have the necessary
flexibility on a continuing basis, over that period of time,
for the purpose of justifying the expensed money and other
investments. Therefore, a prime objective for the system is
its development within the specified constraints of oper-
ating and maintenance costs. Figure 5.2 shows the major
elements involved in cost effectiveness and some of the

























LCC involves all costs associated with the system life
cycle, to include:
• R&D Cost:
Research and development cost (R&D) , the cost of feasi-
bility studies, system analysis, detailed design and devel-
opment, fabrication, assembly, test of engineering models,
initial system test and evaluation, associated documenta-
tion.
• Production and Construction Cost:
Production models, operation and maintenance of the
production capability, associated initial logistic support
and support requirements.
• Operation and Maintenance Cost:
The cost of sustaining operation, personnel and mainte-
nance support, spare/repair parts and related inventories,
test and support equipment maintenance, transportation and
handling, facilities, and modification.
• System Retirement and Phase-out Cost:
The cost of phasing the system out of the inventory due
to obsolecense or wearout, and subsequent equipment item
recycling and reclamation as appropriate [ Ref . 20].
The LCC of a system is strongly influenced by the deci-
sions made in its early stages. Decisions that are made
during the concept exploration phase, until the milestone I
decision, fix approximately 70 percent of the life-cycle
costs. Roughly 85 percent of the life-cycle costs are locked
in before full-scale development phase begins. It is obvious
that this pivotal phase f s decisions with respect to the
logistics support strategy establish both support costs of
the system and operational costs. In figure 5.3 it is shown
that expenditures up-front are but small fractions of the
total LCC of a system. Precisely 95 percent of LCC is
incurred in the production and deployment phase, after the
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milestone III decision. This event represents an indicator
of the large leverage that expenditures up-front can have on
expenditures later in the program. As a rule of thumb, the
designer feels that the up-front spending of money gives him
the promise that he may achieve benefits and significant
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The existence of acquisition improvement actions affect
the estimation of the cost-benefit ratio and cost avoidance.
These actions include Pre-Planned Product Improvement (P3I)
,
Multiyear Procurement, Capital Incentives, and the mainte-
nance of a Warm Production Base.
C. PRE-PLANNED PBODDCT IMPROVEMENT (P3I)
This section will discuss the first action. The second
action will be discussed in the following section, while the
remaining actions will be discussed in Chapter IX pertaining
to the establishment of new policies.
P3I is different than the idea of "product improvement".
In a typical P3I program the system or product is designed
in such a manner as to be ready to accept the new as-yet-
unavailable technology and the new updated improvements.
Electric power, weight, volume and provision of interfaces
are allocated necessary for the future implementation of the
anticipated improvements. Alsc the basic system and the
development of the improvement are carried out in parallel.
In other words they are seeking together to meet future
threats through an orderly process.
A typical P3I program "has two principal costs: the cost
of developing an improved technology in parallel with the
basic technology and the cost of preparing the basic product
to accept the improved technology. There are, of course,
reasons other than cost avoidance for carrying out a P3I
program, such as keeping alternate technologies alive and
stimulating competition" [Ref. 22].
D. MDLTIYEAR PROCUREMENT
The second action is multiyear procurement. In this
action the contractor is in a position to purchase and
construct certain items for the purpose of reaching the
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needs that the whole program requires. Instead of year- by-
year current arrangements, these items are incurred only
once during the program. A strong correlation coefficient
exists between the cost avoidance and the type of item to be
procured. The user may either procure a great amount of
small items such as ammunition, yielding large amounts of
money, or may buy a small number of large items. Needless to
say, when the government allows the contractor to spend
money up-front for productivity improvements and economic
lot buys, it also incurs financial liability. This situ-
ation takes place when the program is cancelled. The Office
of the SECDEF is leaning toward a conservative posture in
which the services will be required to budget for the
cancellation ceiling, thus removing this money from the
available obligation authority.
figure 5.4 shows the system life cycle with the existing
constraints, needs and the new technology associated with



























Figure 5.4 System Life Cycle
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VI. ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT IN THE GREEK NAVY
A. THEEAT ASSESSMENT
Greece has belonged to the NATO alliance for thirty-four
years. Although major weapon systems are acquired for the
purpose of establishing a strong force in this southeastern
Hediteranean corner, characterized as critical by the alli-
ance, Greece must also protect its borders and provide for
the security of the Nation.
Threats coming from every direction are evaluated by the
proper services. Their decisions are defined, estimated,
refined and proposed to the high level decision makers who
belong either to the GEETHA or to the Government.
Like all economies in the growth stage, the country is
subject to a variety of constraints based on the appropriate
reallocation of its resources. It has to measure the antici-
pated results from decisions that affect or could affect the
stability of its major plans as they relate to the economic
condition, public health, education, commercial trading, and
generally the quality of life of its citizens. This is the
main idea which the country has to establish in order to
carry out all of its needs in ar optimum priority.
B. NAVY NEEDS
The Navy has to establish, to implement, to carry out,
and to provide to its forces major systems, taking into
account the assessment of the need, and the constraints due
to budget limits. Every year the government authorizes a
certain amount of drachmae for each branch of the armed
forces. The Navy has to cover its needs in major and minor
weapon systems with this amount. If the budget is
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insufficient to cover all these needs, then the increase in
the given amount depends upon the government's discretion.
The designation of the optimum system in parallel with
the estimation of the need are the two principal factors
that cover every acquisition cf a new major system. The
alteration of these systems are also stabilized by the same
factors. In order to approach this problem, the Navy estab-
lishes scientific information, industry information, and the
details that are coming to the Navy's branches. Any existing
systems in the international market must be inspected by the
services, and tested to demonstrate their capabilities in
the real world regardless of their specifications.
Since Greece does not have the capability to construct
such systems, it has to rely upon foreign industries, which
offer a variety of modern weapons systems.
C. ACQUISITION PROCEDURES
1 . Branch Al
For whatever is referred to the Navy's procurement
of major systems, the branch A 1 (plans and operations) is
authorized to identify the security need and the required
appropriate program to meet this need. For that purpose it
makes its suggestions to the armament division (ARD) , in a
document called "Introductory Memorandum" (IM) . The ARD is
staffed by specialists in technical matters so it focuses
its attention on how to establish all the necessary tech-
nical requirements, included in the same document. The
suggestions of the ARD include improvement of the proposed
requirements for the purpose of establishing additional
criteria or, on the other side, elimination of the factors
that could also cover the required specific characteristics
of the proposed major weapon system. After the preparation
of these details, the office of the director of the ARD
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submits the document to the office of the Deputy Chief of
GEN (DCGEN)
.
2. Deputy Chief of GEN
The DCGEN carries the authority to reinspect and
redefine the specific aspects among those that are submitted
to his office. Approval of the IM authorizes proceeding
into the next step. That represents a written order given
by the DCGEN through which a special committee is estab-
lished.
3 . Special Committee
This committee operates under the chairmanship of a
captain or a flag officer with previous related experience.
The committee includes 5 to 7 officers with advanced and
specific knowledge in matters pertaining to engineering,
mechanics, communications, artillery, etc. Among them a
supply officer is included who has the responsibility to
verify criteria relative to the national economy and
contracting situations. He may have experience in contracts,
rather than scientific background in contracting procedures
as these criteria are well defined in the U.S Navy.
The special committee has the authority and the
responsibility granted by the DCGEN, for a detailed examina-
tion and appraisal of the wide spectrum of major weapon
systems and to take into account the two major factors, the
need and the optimum system. If a proposed system satisfies
the acceptable level of the reguirements but fails to meet
the optimum level it may be rejected. Other criteria that
the committee may be faced with include political involve-
ment, third parties 1 involvement, negotiations with the
interested parties necessary tc select the one that meets
the Navy's needs, and legal restrictions. [Ref. 34].
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a. Political Involvement
Since every industry operates under the law of
the nation in which it is located, the government has the
authority to prohibit the sale of such systems in another
country (embargo)
.
b. Third Parties 1 s Involvement
In some cases the committee may be faced with
the extra involvement of an industry that did not make its
appearance during the early stages of the evaluation and
appraisal of the advantages and disadvantages of a weapon
system.
c. Negotiations
Negotiations take place between the interested
country and the various manufacturers before the agreement.
Their scope consists of exchanging information as far as the
behaviour of the system in the real world. In such cases the
committee may visit the plant and/or the laboratories of the
negotiator's industry in order to acquire first hand infor-
mation about the specific characteristics of his product.
Also the negotiations cover topics such as the required
quantity of the system, the time limits within which the
system will be provided to the interested party, financial
and technical guarantees, and procedures for the payment
until the acquitance.
d. Legal Restrictions
The special committee takes into account that
some countries are subject to the constraints imposed by
legal restrictions, for what is referred either to the
production and/or the sale of major weapon systems.
After the completion of the above examinations,
visits, observations, and appraisals, the committee submits
its detailed descriptions to the DCGEN. The DCGEN has the
authority to approve, cancel, or to change the document if
he believes that the committee did not appraise some key
factors, although these two latter situations represent
exceptions. If his approval is given, then the document is
sent by his office again back tc the armament division. This
division is the only one that selects the major system to be
proposed, and submits the IM to the A' branch for further
evaluation in operational aspects and requirements. Figure
6.1 shows the decision participants within the Navy.
D. FI1A1 MAJOB DECISIONS
The IM is submitted to the C* branch that attaches, in
the form of memos, its detailed information about the logis-
tics evaluation and economics coordination. The final memo
is attached by the E' branch including matters pertaining to
af fordability due to the budget, thresholds, and flexibility
due to which the major system cculd be payed.
1
.
A^GEN via DC GEN
The DCGEN may add his final observations and notifi-
cations before the submission of the document to the A/GEN.
He finally introduces the document to the Supreme Council of
the Navy, which may accept or reject it. Approval of this
final proposal authorizes proceeding into consideration by
the GEETHA.
2. DEM via GEETHA-SAGE
The A/GEETKA may express his opinion upon the
proposed system. However, a review is made by the branches














Figure 6.1 Decision Participants in the Greek Navy
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review is made by the Council of Chiefs of General Staffs
where the system is proposed by the A/GEETHA.
3. KYSEA via DEM
The final decision as tc whether the system will be
acquired or not rests upon the Governmental Council of
National Defense. This proposal is submitted to the council
by the DEM. The KYSEA operates under the chairmanship of the
Prime Minister who has the responsibility to inform the
parliament of Greece about the acquisition whenever a polit-
ical party requests such information. The A/GEETHA is
usually invited to participate in the KYSEA in order to
express his opinion about specific details that may be ques-
tioned by the member ministers.
Figure 6.2 indicates the decision participants
within the DOD, and figure 6.3 indicates the stages that
take place in ships acquisition process.
E. COMMITTEE OF ATTENDING AND ACQUIRING THE SYSTEM
1 . Domestic Ind ustry
When approval is given by the KYSEA and the contract
is signed by the two parties the A/GEN is authorized to
appoint a committee of four (usually officers) whose duties
and responsibilities are defined in a written order signed
by the A/GEN. These duties consist of attending and
acquiring the whole construction of the ship (s) in all
its (their) phases and stages. The specific responsibilities
of this committee are also included in the contract
[Bef. 35].
This agreement states that the buyer will appoint
specialized and authorized representatives, from now on
referred to as "inspectors" or "Committee of Attending and
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execution of the agreement in all its stages. The inspectors
and the committee may be the same person. Nevertheless,
until such inspectors or committee are appointed, the manu-
facturer will apply to the buyer himself, who will carry out
the duties of the inspectors or the committee. The manufac-
turer will follow the suggestions of the inspectors as far
as they agree with the contract and the specifications of
the ship. The duties, rights and obligations of the
inspectors/committee are described below.
Acquisition and delivery of the ship will be based
on the following documents:
• A protocol of acquisition and delivery is signed by the
head inspector and by the manufacturer following the
trials that are provided by the agreement and by which
(protocol) it is certified that the ship was built
according to the agreement
• Operational trials of the main and auxiliary machinery
and of the electrical and electronic equipment
• Sea trials designed to prove the characteristics of all
the ship's operations through the sea trials, while in
dock and during sailing
• The buyer will have the right to supervise the execu-
tion of the work in the shipyard, as is provided by the
agreement. The manufacturer will also receive permis-
sion by the suppliers and sub-contractors permitting
the buyer's inspector to inspect the stored or manufac-
tured items or the work executed in the suppliers' or
sub-contractors' premises. Such inspection can take
place on any working day and time in the factory, work-
shops or laboratories of the manufacturer and his sub-
contractors, where the ships or parts of her will be
under construction or trial in their storehouses, where
the materials and the accessories are stored. The
buyer's inspectors have also the right to attend any
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workshop or laboratory where trials are executed by the
manufacturer or his sub-contractor and inspect the work
and the material, except in restricted areas in the
premises of the manufacturer or the sub-contractor
• The inspectors will have the right to reject any
material and job if they think that they do not agree
with the agreement. It will be the manufacturer's
responsibility to assure the buyer that immediate meas-
ures have been taken for the settlement. In case that
the materials or the manufacturer's work is same or
similar to the one of the existing ships, then the
inspectors can reject them only if the same actions
were taken for existing ships and for the same reasons
• The manufacturer will give all the reasonable accommo-
dation to the buyer's inspector and will ask the same
to be done by his suppliers and sub-contractors
• All the inspections and estimations will be held in
such a way so the work is not unjustly delayed. Any
designs that the manufacturer would submit to the buyer
for approval will be returned to the manufacturer with
the maker's approval or reirarks, if there are any, in
twenty (20) days from the date of the submission. If no
reply is received during that period, the designs will
be considered approved
• The manufacturer will arrange for proper offices and
accommodation for the buyer's inspectors inside the
premises where the work is executed without any charge,
as well as telephone connection for local calls and
telex not inferior than tc the ones arranged for the
manufacturer's own personnel
• The manufacturer will advise the inspectors regarding
the availability of materials, which will be ready for
the trials in the factory at least one week earlier.
The manufacturer will also advise on time in case of
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preliminary checkings (in the factory), so that the
inspectors will be able to attend. The inspection will
start at once and not later than a week from the
disbursing of the materials for inspection
• The manufacturer is obliged to give to the inspectors
two (2) copies of each sub-contracting agreement, which
contain all the terms except for the price and the
economic terms. The actions of the buyer's inspectors
do not release the manufacturer from his exclusive
obligation for satisfactory and timely execution of the
agreement. The manufacturer and sub-contractors ought
to maintain systems for quality inspections, covering
the designing, wherever this is necessary, materials,
and productivity and should satisfy the claims included
in the quality control
• It is understood that the above systems of quality
control will be interpreted according to the systems
held in the manufacturer's shipyard and will be
completed by the maker's concrete application, leing
agreed between the buyer and the manufacturer
• The quality control in the suppliers' and sub-
contractors' premises, the compliance to the relative
specification of material and work being included, will
be carried out by the buyer's inspector. Also it will
be entrusted, following buyer's applications, to
specialized firms of the supplier's or the sub-
contractor's country
• The buyer will acknowledge to the manufacturer in three
(3) days from the receipt of this agreement, which
material and sub-contracting jobs will need supervision
by specialized firms. The buyer will apply directly to
the said firms and any expenses relative to these
inspections will be of the buyer's expense. In all the
other cases the buyer will accept the sappliers' or the
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sub-contractors 1 certificates, certifying that the
supplied materials or the job agree with their specifi-
cations
• The manufacturer will submit a report of work progress
to the buyer and an up to date productivity time table
of the shipbuilding and the equipment of the ship as
well as photos proving the building progress
• The manufacturer, before taking any order for supply of
materials and machinery, should have first received the
buyer's approval for the technical specifications and
for the suitability of the suppliers and sub-
contractors to which he plans to give the orders,
according to the agreement. It is understood that in
case the manufacturer intends to give the order to the
same supplier or sub-contractor the buyer will maintain
the same administrative and technical requirements. In
this case the procedure for the inspector's approval
granted by the buyer will rot be applied
2 • Foreign Industry
Whatever is referred tc the procurements from the
foreign industries implies some differences from what is
implemented in the domestic one.
After the agreement between the two interested
parties is approved and signed, the buyer implements a team
of officers under the command of a senior officer.
The team includes specialists in mechanical engi-
neering, electronics engineering, shipbuilding, and armor.
Also a supply officer, the cajtain of the ship, and the
chief engineer are included.
Their duties consist of three major topics. Economic
affairs, close attendance of the construction relative to
the shipbuilding, and personnel training.
• Economic Affairs:
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The commander of the team carries the responsibility
to pay the installments to the manufacturer via the supply
officer. If the amount to be paid is above $100K the bank of
Greece authorizes the manufacturer's bank to pay the money.
Before this payment is made the team commander has to make a
report to the GEN. This report includes verification of
shipbuilding progress, according to the contract. In such
cases the consultant shipbuilder officer reports to the
commanding officer as to what progress been made. However,
whenever a modification is needed to the plans proposed
either by the manufacturer or by the buyer, the latter party
has to pay the difference for the excess amount, or the
builder to reduce the amount from what is referred in the
contract.
A second responsibility includes the acquisition of
the spare parts and the items on board. Since any modifica-
tions may imply analogous change in the required items, the
specific consultant officer reports to the team leader, who
has the authority to accept or, seldom, reject the proposed
changes.
The third major duty of the economic affairs has a
relationship with the training expenditures. The contractor
or the subcontractors make a training schedule in his (their)
laboratories for the purpose of providing the required
knowledye in the new systems to the buyer's personnel. It is
possible for this training to be either included in the
contract and hence the money that will be payed is fixed, or
to be required by the GEN and so the necessary amount to be
under agreement by both sides. Regardless of the scheduled
or unscheduled training, the buyer has to pay exchange in




There is a close cooperation between the specialist
officers. Every modification, chanye or rejection in
upcoming installations has to he approved by them. Since
they represent the buyer country, they can only advise the
GEN via the commanding officer of any modifications that
should be made.
• Personnel Training:
This duty rests upon the captain of the ship.
Priority is given to the officers training first and
secondly to the enlisted personnel. That is why the officers
and the chief petty officers are going to constitute the
kernel of the unit under construction. For the purpose of
achieving his objective the captain separates his personnel
into uniform groups based on their duties. In these groups a
key officer represents the leader. All the leaders report to
the captain so he is well informed about the progress in the
education phase. He may decide the extention of the training
or the elimination of this time. By the time the training is
finished the captain can proceed into the next phase named,
"on the job training". This chase is separated into two
steps. Both of them are under the captain's control.
• Dock Trials:
They usually last 10 to 20 days and check every
system working either alone or in connection with any other
subsystems. The captain may decide the proportion of the
personnel that has to be on beard. However a team of the
manufacturer's staff and his technicians is present during
these trials for the purpose of verifying the capability of
any installed system.
• Sea Trials:
In this final phase the ship's personnel, the team
of the country, the representatives of the manufacturer, and
a staff of experts are on board. These trials have the
purpose to approve the "well done" of the unit as a whole
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and to check its operational capability in the real world.
For any damages or repairs incurred in this phase the
builder carries the responsibility to fix according to the
specifications included in the contract. The staff and the
enlisted personnel become accustomed to the ship's require-
ments / and so the country is ready to accept the new unit
and to provide it to the fleet.
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VII. CONTRACTING PROCEDURES IN THE GREEK NAVY
A. BRANCH E»
The Hellenic contracting department operates under the
direction of the fifth branch of the GEN (E' Branch) . Its
director, who usually carries the rank of commodore, is a
supply officer and reports to the A/GEN via the Deputy Chief
of GEN. He also has the responsibility to carry out whatever
subject is referred to his branch. He commands the supply
directorate, the directorate of contracts, the directorate
of accounting and budget, and finally the directorate of
economic affairs and personnel rights. Figure 7.1 shows the
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1 • Director ate of Contracts
This division has authority to formalize contracts,
to acquire major systems and for the repair of such systems.
The transportation and insurance of major systems rests upon
the responsibilities of the E' Eranch, whether the procure-
ment has been entrusted to foreign or domestic industry. The
payment for major systems is included in the duties of this
branch.
2. Bids
The specific authorities of branch E' consist of
announcing international public bids for procurement,





The E' branch collaborates with the appropriate
divisions for the purpose of evaluating the various bids
that are offered from domestic and foreign industries. The
main scope of this action is to evaluate all the bids and
reject those that do not present an acceptable offerer.
In all cases this branch works together with divi-
sions that develop the description of the detailed require-
ments for the different systetts that constitute a major
system (electronic equipment, guns, facilities, mechanical
equipment, etc.). This cooperation results in drafting an
appropriate list of special terms of agreement for public
international bidding. After the acceptance of the contract
plan has been made between the contracting directorate and
the requiring directorate, the E* Branch introduces the
contract for Supreme Council of the Navy for approval. This
approval is to proceed into the international competition
phase. A copy of the requirement and the descriptions of
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various subsystems are sent to the interested bidders as is
shown in Figure 7.2 [Bef. 25].
1 • Ministry, D ecision
The E f branch takes into account the fact that in
some cases a ministry decisioE is required for acquiring
major systems. That means the decision of the GEN and GEETHA
has to be approved by the proper ministries, in order that
the procurement be executed.
5 . Payments
The above branch has the responsibility of paying
the manufacturers via the Bank cf Greece to which the branch
gives instructions and orders atout the exact amount of full
payment or installments. That is why it has the authority
to communicate with the offerers for matters pertaining the
execution of the various steps cf the contract, the collec-
tion of the different invoices, and the final payments of
the expenses [Ref. 2 6].
B. GENERAL TERMS OF AGREEMENT
1 . Existing Pol ici es
The public international competitive bidding follows
the rules, procedures, and instructions given by the
Presidential Decree 785/1978 that states the procurements
and contract works for Armed Forces [Ref. 27].
According to this decree, eligibility to participate
in the bidding either personally or through their authorized
representative on condition are the persons that have not
been excluded by the DEM, by services of the Armed Forces
hierarchy authorized by him, cr by other competent state
Authorities. So the persons that can participate are Greek



































industrial, or handicraft profession relevant to the subject
of procurement either in Greece or in foreign countries
during the current year of bidding. Also in this category
are included the representatives of the aforesaid natural or
legal persons, and the trusts or cooperative associations
from those residing in Greece.
The aforementioned participants should provide
specific documents pertaining to their eligibility,
according to the GreeX legislation.
2 . Advance Payment
After signing of the relevant contract, an advance
payment up to 80 percent of the value of items under
procurement can be made to the contractor at the Hellenic
Navy's discretion and only in exceptional cases, against a
guarantee of equal amount. The above advance payment is
effected only in exceptional cases. These cases require the
approval of the GEN and only in the event the bidder has
requested it in his bid at the time of bidding, where he
provides enough data (raw material to be procured, etc) which
the advance payment will be based on.
The amount of the advance payment guarantee will be
reduced proportionally to the value of each delivery and
will be returned after the final delivery. When a supplier
is declared as forfeited or the contract is dissoluted, he
has to return the amount of the advance payment in due time.
If the supplier refuses to return this amount, the advance
payment guarantee is drawn on plus an amount of an estimated
interest with the highest valid proportion of its legal act.
The above interest is computed on the value of unde-
livered material for the period starting from the date of
the advance payment till the date of contract dissolution or
the date of declaration of the supplier as forfeited.
Similarly beyond the date of the contract breakage or
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declaration of the contractor as forfeited and up to the
time the advance payment is paid back there is a corre-
sponding interest of time (days) . That is estimated with
the later valid proportion of legal and time exceeding
(days) interest.
3
. Unseali ng and Evaluation of Bids-Objections
At the date and time fixed for the bidding in a
public meeting, the Bidding Ccmmittee unseals the bids by
priority of receipt recording them in a report. For those
bids unsealed untimely and by mistake, a special report,
duly justified, is issued by the Committee and these bids
are announced first during the bidding.
A bid not covering the terms of agreement and not
including the proper guarantee is initially considered as
resectable. The bids and acconpanying documents are init-
ialled by the Committee and the certificates are returned to
the beneficiaries after they are checked.
The Committee announces to the present bidders the
prices and terms of all bidders, as well as the assigned
score, any conclusions drawn from the technical appraisal of
the material to be procured. Also, it decides on the
typical validity or invalidity cf each bid according to the
importance of any possible deviations stating its opinion in
writing in the relevant report.
Bids containing, in the opinion of the Committee,
unimportant deviations from the terms of agreements are
considered at the Committee's discretion as being in agree-
ment with them. Bids with the same price for the same item
of egual guality, guantity, and other characteristics are
considered as equivalent. In this case the bidding at the
Committee's discretion continues orally among the eguall
bidders on a report within a reasonable time determined by
the Hellenic Navy. The bidding can also be awarded among the
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equal bidders at equal proportions or it can be awarded to
the bidder drawn by lot in public session.
No appeal for any reason is accepted, unless
submitted in writing to the Committee at the time of the
bidding. The Committee irrevocatly judges and decides on the
objections, mentioning the reasons in its report, without
postponing or discontinuing the bidding in progress.
U. Exclusion of Bidders from all Procurements of the
Armed Forces
By decision of the Chief of the GSETHA, following a
justified proposal of the Hellenic Navy General Staff,
bidders failing to fulfil their obligations towards the
State and proven to be unreliable suppliers may be excluded
temporarily or permanently from the list of suppliers of the
Armed Forces.
Within fifteen (15) days from the notification of
the above decision a written objection may be submitted upon
which the DEM will judge and decide.
5- Bidding Award - Notification of Adjudication
Bidding award is subject to approval of the Greek
Navy. The bearer of financial authority or jurisdiction to
make the awarding decision will judge and decide on the
approval and award of said bid.
The bidders are obliged to wait for the issue of the
aforesaid decision until the expiration date of their bid.
After that they may reguest in writing to be released of any
obligations and their guarantees to be returned to them
without any other claim on their part against the Hellenic
Armed Forces in regard to their bid.
The notification of bidding award decision as well
as all relevant documents to the bidder are considered as
lawfully delivered in case that these cannot be handed to
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him personally, if these are posted in the offices of the
bidding service or at the address where the bidding took
place.
6 • Declaration of a Suppli er as Forfeited, Penalties,
Arbitration
In the event the supplier should fail to deliver
within the contractual time, the material awarded or the
material rejected by the acceptance Committee for replace-
ment, he is declared forfeited by the Service and the
following penalties are imposed.
Forfeiture from the bid awarded to him as well as
from any right arising out of it.
Forfeiture of the good performance guarantee in
favour of the Hellenic Navy Pension Fund. Procurement of the
material (s) either through the next lower bidder or through
a new invitation to bids or without it. That depends on the
requirements of the Hellenic Navy and by charging the
forfeited bidder with any extra amount collected either from
any amount due to the supplier from the Greek State or
according to the provisions for collection of revenues of
the State. Also any delay in delivery imposes the applica-
tion of penalties.
The aforesaid penalties are independent from any
other claims of the Hellenic Navy in regard to any positive
losses caused to it directly or indirectly by refusal of the
supplier to implement timely the adjudication procurement to
him. The Hellenic Navy may accept a delayed delivery but
imposes the various fines calculated on the value of the
total delayed delivery. That can be established regardless
of delay duration and of the value of the delayed material
which, although delivered, cannot be used because of the
delayed part.
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If the supplier does not agree with the decision of
the acceptance Committee, for the total or partial rejection
of the contract material, or for a redaction of the contrac-
tual price, he has the right to ask for the application of
the arbitration clauses within two days from the signing of
the rejection protocol. In case that the members of the
Acceptance Committee do not come to an agreement in regard
to aforementioned disputes then the decision on arbitration
will be taken by the bearer of the financial authority or
jurisdiction.
7. Exception from Penalties - Force Majeure.
No penalties are imposed to the supplier in case
force majeure is ascertained on account of which an
inability to deliver the material within the contractual
time was caused. The burden of proving force majeure lies
upon the supplier. Cases of force majeure as considered
indicatively as general or partial strike entailing inter-
ruption of the works of the supplier's firm or factory, fire
in the supplier's firm or factory, flood, earthquake, war,
electrical power cut-off and lock out following an approval
of manufacturer's associations.
The aforesaid cases cf force majeure must be
reported by the supplier to the Hellenic Navy in writing
within two (2) days from the tine they occur or in case they
last long from the day they cease to exist by the
Contractor. This should be certified by a competent
Authority of the supplier's country. In case that the
material is procured from abroad the said force majeure
should be reported within ten (10) days.
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VIII. ACQUISITION PROCESS. COMPARISON BETWEEN US NAVY AND
GREEK NAZI
A. SIHIIARITIES-DIFPERENCES
Any existing similarities between the two systems as far
as they concern the ship acquisition process can be summa-
rized in the following areas: the mission need determination
and threat assessment, the procedures established for the
system to be acquired, and the concern for the cost of the
system and its deployment.
However, any existing similarities may also include
differences in matters pertaining to specific procedures
based on the detailed and written rules followed by the U.S.
Navy. Thanks to the strong economic system, the huge stra-
tegic force, the specialization in all the professions and
the strongest industrial base, the U.S. has to face only one
major problem. That is its security and the strength of the
NATO alliance.
1 . Mission Need Cetermination-Threat Assessment
The U.S. Navy identifies a security threat, either
by actual events or by their prediction, relative to the day
by day improvements in high quality weapon systems. The
scope of these predictions represents not only insurance for
itself but also constitutes a protection for every country
in the NATO alliance. But the major factor remains the one
that has been established by the Congress and it consists of
the recognizing of a continuing need for international
defense cooperation for the purpose of implementing peace
and security in every place.
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The U.S. has to spend a large amount of dollars
every year in completing their needs either in weapon
systems or technology base programs. However their declara-
tion remains as how to be a part of a world free from
burdens and the variety of dangerous conditions coming from
the armaments. So they subordirate the use of force to the
rule of law. Figure 8.1 shows the funding for strategic
defense for the years 1984-1989 [Ref. 37].
The U.S., also trying to limit the intensity of a
conflict, has to be able to be protected from an attack and
to restore the peace. A major factor remains as how U.S.
can face the conflict by using such forces to stop rather
than to extend the war.
Greece, on the same side, uses a similar strategic
concept. The Navy has to protect the nation's property and
to support the alliance in that area. SECDEF in the Annual
Report to the Congress for the fiscal year 1935 states that
the security of the U.S. is inextricably linked to the inde-
pendence of the democracies of Western Europe. In recog-
nizing this fact and the threat, the U.S. has joined with
fourteen European nations and Canada in the collective
defense alliance. In peacetime, the United States stations
ground and air forces in Europe and deploys naval forces in
the Atlantic and Mediterranean [Ref. 36].
Additionally the current Greek view places peace as
the primary value, thus the focus is more on how her policy
may establish peace and less en the military re guirements
for maintaining security. But given the widely considered
excess of military power in the world, the support for
defense spending is gradually eroding. That forces the
country to implement criteria as far as the priorities of
the major weapon systems necessary to be acquired in order
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Figure 8-1 Funding for Strategic Defense
2- L^il 22. the Private Industry
The acquisition of major weapon systems in the U.S.
Navy implements the requirements of circulars A- 109 and
A-76. Both state that the government has to rely upon the
participation of the private industry for non-governmental
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activities, for the purpose cf exploiting its resources.
The famous economist, Professor John Kenneth Galbraith,
expressed his opinion that these industries are already
public since the major proportion of their capital was
funded by the government, and their products were not price
competitive. Finally he states that even when the industries
made faults and failed to achieve the required performance
the government sustains them [Ref. 5].
The same strategy is implemented by the Greek legis-
lation. The law 1262 of the _jear 1983 establishes invest-
ment incentives to encourage industry to locate their
activities in regions near the torders of the country and in
some cases, far away from Athens. Also it establishes the
same incentives in order to encourage them to construct
major systems, high technology products, and importation of
computer technology. In one of these industries, the Fast
Patrol Boats were constructed by Greek personnel, super-
vising all the specific stages in these shibuildings.
3 • Decision Makers
In the U.S. Navy the final decision concerning the
proposed system rests upon the SECDEF. Therefore, after the
SECDEF's approval he continues to control the major weapon
system until its provision to the operating forces with one
exception. He will not delegate his authority to the SECNAV
for the program to proceed into the phase Production and
Deployment (Milestone III), when the established thresholds
in milestone II have been breached.
In the Greek acguisiticn process the DEM gives the
final approval by introducing the program to the KYSEA. On
the other side the A/GEN is responsible to carry out the
whole program by giving his instructions to the team respon-
sible for acquiring the system. The teams report to the
A/GEN via their commanding officers, for whatever applies to
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the schedule or its modificaticns in constructing the ship
and in the area of logistics support.
**• j?l§£ for the Acguisitior of Maj_or Systems
During the Concept Exploration phase two significant
activities are established. The Acquisition Strategy and the
Program Manager. Both are strictly related since the PM has
to implement the acquisition strategy in every stage of the
shipbuilding. This strategy represents an overall plan
through which a program for carrying out a weapon system
should be followed until the major system is provided to the
fleet or other operating forces. This concept may also
include assistance and advice given by experts in the same
area, since the acquisition strategy in many cases is unique
for each program. On the other side the PM is the only
responsible person to carry out the whole program by
following either the charter or experimental events of the
real world. He is also responsible for research, develop-
ment, evaluation, procurement and deployment and generally
for an effective overall management for a specific weapon
system [fief. 38].
Additionally the PM carries the authority and
responsibility to be present and to inform the appropriate
committee of the Congress for whatever applies to a specific
program as far as the spent money [ Ref . 39].
As far as the Greek Navy concerns, neither the
acquisition strategy nor the establishment of the PM are
clearly defined. The country's responsibility is limited to
the overall management of the specific weapon system that is
going to be acquired. That means the team responsible to
acquire the major weapon system can give his proposals to
the manufacturer for any modifications, without having the
authority to alter any subunits included in the contract.
This authority rests upon the GEN.
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5. CJNAJ-NAVMAT and GEN^FLJST HEADQUARTERS
In the U.S. Navy, th€ user is represented by the
Office of Chief of Naval Operations and the producer by the
Chief of Naval Material. The latter works for the OPNAV in
order to provide the fleet with the best weapon systems.
SECDEE's opinion in this position is that the U.S. not only
must expand the forces of the ships to meet the worldwide
commitments of the U.S. forward defense strategy but also
they must upgrade the quality of their forces. Countering
the future threat requires that the U.S. forces use the
resources in more innovative and efficient ways.
The similar concept also exists in the Greek Navy.
It focuses its attention on the fleet. The major proportion
of the needs take into account the necessities for the ships
being in operation.
6 • Milestones
The four milestones and the five phases in U.S. Navy
are clearly defined in such a way as to thoroughly inspect
the cost, schedule, research, thresholds, and operational
analysis. Greece does not have clearly defined phases and
also the cost and schedule are included in the contract and
represent constraints that are implemented after the agree-
ment with the manufacturer.
7 . Biddings
The U.S. Navy acts based on the completion within
the domestic industry considering factors such as cost,
schedule, strengthening the industrial base, and perform-
ance. Additionally the small business office in NAVSEA acts
as protector of the small industries (those having less than
1000 employees) trying to exploit their resources.
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Precisely in this point the SBCDEF's opinion and
position has to be noticed. In the annual report to the
Congress for fiscal year 1985 he states that within the last
few months the DOD has instituted a sweeping acquisition
improvement program that comprised 32 major initiatives to
bring good business sense to defense procurement. Also DOD,
in order to correct long standing inefficiencies, has taken
measures to budget more realistically for future acquisi-
tions, to encourage more competition, to produce equipment
at more efficient rates, and to infuse greater stability
into defense contracting.
Greece does not have this flexibility since the
country has to rely on the foreign industry, trying to find
the exact major weapon system that could meet the optimum
cost and the operational requirements. This event causes the
country to suffer by the large expenditures summarized in
billions of drachmae.
3 • E§.§p_ons Sy_§tem Modifications
The PM has authority tc implement any changes that
he decides useful and necessary in every stage of the
construction of a ship. He acts independently within the
constraints of the thresholds and has a direct communication
with the NAVHAT or the commander of the SYSCOM to whom he
reports for matters pertaining to every phase and problem of
the major weapon system. Also he is thoroughly supported by
the contracting officer (CO) who represents him in contrac-
tual situations.
The PM in Greek acquisition process is not exactly
defined. This concept is represented by the leader and the
specialists (Officers) in the team under his command. They
have limited authorities to propose modifications since for
any major decisions they have to make relative reports to
the GEN to which these decisions depend on. In such cases
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the manufacturer has to agree with the submitted changes of
the buyer, since these are net included in the contract
between the interested parties.
9 . logistics
Logistics support is defined in the early stages of
the acquisition process in U.S.Navy and is accelerated in
the Full Scale Development Phase. A detailed examination of
the necessary items in the appropriate quantity is refined.
That results in the preparation of the Integrated Logistics
Support before the ship is entered in the operational
forces.
In the Greek procedures the spare-repair parts,
special tools and eguipment devices are included in the
contract and in many cases in the recommendation lists that
are provided by the manufacturer. The country firstly may
accept all the recommended support equipments. But secondly
it can inspect all the written spare-repair parts needed for
the ship. In such cases the appropriate services GEN-FIeet
Headquarters- Logistics-Administration Command and Naval
Supply Center make up their minds concerning the exact qaan-
tity of every item that should be either on the ship or in
the bases (NSC in U.S.). Also a situation may exist that the
prices for the spare parts of one ship may far exceed the
prices of the same items of a previous (same type) warship.
These unusual conditions may arise either because of the
inflation or the higher wage rate or in any other situ-
ations. Pegardless of the above conditions the country has
to pay a lot of money or to pay the manufacturer with ether
products.
10. Production and Deployment
The U.S. has at its disposal a huge industrial base.
Every major system is developed in the domestic industry.
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The technology base programs absorb money regardless of
their output. The research centers are financed by the
government and the private sector. The U.S., in trying to
stay as the leader of the western world, spends a great
amount of their resources for Defense Programs and for
giving aid to other countries. Sreece, with its limited
resources and the lack of the necessary industrial base, is
forced to deploy the systems from international industry.
Progress has been made in this area and it seems that the
adequate combination of the advanced (existing) scientific
personnel and the shipbuilders could lead the country to
develop the indispensable motivations.
1 1 . Proposed Acq uisit ion Pr ocess
Up to this point a detailed description of the
acquisition process has been made for the U.S. Navy and the
Greek Navy. Also similarities and differences existing in
the two systems have been described. The following chapter
will provide a proposed policy/flan, and in the final one an
attempt will be made to show hew this policy/plan could be
established.
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IX. PROPOSED POLICY^PLAN FOR THE GREEK NAVY
This chapter includes two parts. The first one repre-
sents an attempt to establish a policy of acquiring major
weapon systems for the Navy. The second includes proposals
for procedures that cculd carry out this policy. The motiva-
tion is strictly related to the establishment of the above
procedures for the purpose of improving the existing acqui-
sition process for major defense systems in the Greek envi-
ronment.
The objective of this thesis remains that of providing
assistance to the managers of the acquisition process, by
making proposals covering the entire role of the programs
and to help improve methods necessary to carry out a whole
program. It must be said that the proposed policy can be
implemented if the lack of the industrial base in the
defense industry does not represent a problem and so this
industry necessitates changes, technology base programs, and
transfusion of this technology into domestic areas. A suit-
able and step-by-step strategy must be established through
which the above three factors would lead to the strength-
ening of the appropriate manufacturing industries.
Four decisions and five stages are the main concepts
surrounding the whole acquisition process.
A. STAGE 1, RECOGNITION
DECISION POINT 1
This stage includes three major considerations necessary
for the inplementation of the beginning of the chain of the
procedures. They are the Existing Need Determination, the
Obsolecense of Existing System, and the New Technology. The
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same branch, as it is done at the present time, can appraise
everything related to the above key factors, such as anal-
yses of assessments, constraints due to limited resources
(budget) , the priorities and the required operational capa-
bilities. Factors such as technical information, mission
definition, purpose for which it has to be acquired, and
impact upon any other existing major programs should be
estimated. All the notifications, descriptions and reasons
due to which a major system should be acquired might be
included in the introductory memorandum. This memorandum
carried a "recognition" of the existing deficiency, is
submitted to the DCGEN requiring relative approval for an
appropriate action. The DCGEN has the authority to approve,
disapprove, or cancel this document and to inform the high
level decision makers by submitting a summary of the
received paper. When the approval is given, it has the
meaning for the requirement to proceed into the next stage.
The DCGEN authorizes the esta tlishment of the PM and the
Contracting Officer (CO) . The idea of the establishment of
both the PM and CO in this stage is to become familiar with
the wide spectrum cf discussions and to be involved in
useful details surrounding the major program, because expert
officers are going to discuss the subjects related to the
weapon systems.
In figure 9.1 the measurable environment is indicated
for the PM, being in the center of the cycle that represents
the various elements involved in the system acquisition
process. Also figure 9.2 shows the non measurable environ-
ment for the same purpose for the same person [Ref. 40].
The duties of the PM and CO have to be written and clar-
ified in a similar way as in the U.S. Navy. The PM will
report directly to the C f Branch of the GEN
(Logistics-Budget coordination) , to the DCGEN, or to the





Figure 9.1 The Measurable Environment for a System
As far as the Contracting Officer is concerned, the
following tasks normally fall within his provinces:
• Contract Administration, while the main supervisor
remains the Program Manager
• Approval of subcontract terms, condition, and costs for
compliance with prescribed make-or-buy decisions
• Preparation of field analyses of contract-change propo-
sals and the impact that may have upon the various
1 1 2
COM PET = COM PETITION
Figure 9-2 The Non-Measurable Environment
involved costs, technical ferf ormance, an! established
schedules
Evaluation of j-roposals for extended overtime and
multishift work for the final approval of the PM
Analyses of the received various reports, overhead
negotiations, property ad ninistration, and an overall
assistance to the Program Manager
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In the following two tables (table 2 and table 3) the
results of a survey are indicated of a sample constituted of
30 PMs, of whom 15 were employed by the DOD and 15 by
private industry. As far as the government PMs concern/
fourteen of them had one year cr less of formal training in
the fields of procurement, contarct administration, and/or
industrial management. The fifteenth PM had four years of
training in these fields. Seven of the 15 PMs had been
involved for two years or less with some segment of private
industry. Most of this contact had occured during their
current assignments. Five PMs had between two and three
years contact with industry. Finally, three of them had four
years' experience with industry.
On the other side all fifteen industry PMs had received
formal education in engineering. Only five of them had any
formal training in business administration. Four of these
five had attended short company-sponsored courses in
advanced management training. The experience level of
industry PMs ranged from 12 to 40 years, with an average of
18 years. While statistics indicated that government PMs had
more formal education than their industry counterparts, not
one government PM had worked one-third as long in program
management as any industry manager [Ref. 5].
At the point where the DCGEN gives his approval the
first decision has been made and this represents the
Decision Point 1 as it is indicated in figure 9.3.
B. STAGE 2, OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND COST ESTIMATION
DECISION POINT 2
This stage represents a critical step in the whole
acquisition process. Essential elements have to be taken
into account in order to meet the national strategy. During
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parallel with the main objective (optimum system, lower
cost). The proposed solutions are evaluated due to their





Training Years in Worked
Industry in Eusin. Current in Com.
Project or Indus. Business vs DOD
Manager Formal Education Practices Activities Projects
1 B.S. Mech. Engin.
2 B.S. Mech. Engin.
3 B.S. Elec . Engin.
4 B.S. Elec. Engin.
B.S. Physics
5 B.S. Math Z Engn.
6 B.S. Engineering Exec.mnmt
training
7 Product Design Co. spon.
Courses mgmt. course
8 B.S. Elec. Engin. Co.AMP
course
9 B.S. Mech. Engin. 1
Commercial Science
10 B.S. Elec. Engin.
11 B.S. Elec. Engin.
12 Math/Chemistry
13 B.S. Engineering
14 B.S. Elec. Engin.

















must be analyzed in order to cover both the present need and
the future plans and objectives. The provision of capabili-
ties are needed to support the independence and stability in
the Nation's region. The modifications of the existing

























^Preparation of Operatic nal Requiremenr?
Figure 9.3 Recognition-Decision Point 1
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flexibility. The selection of the most promising concepts
is inspected and causes an outline description from the ?M
and his staff. The E' Branch prepares the international
competitive biddings. The C 1 Branch, responsible for
Logistics support in cooperation with the D' Branch, respon-
sible for mechanical, electrical and electronic systems of
the ship, will estimate the required items to support the
system. Also their suggestions may include required opera-
tional availability and maintainability based on previous
experience.
The above appraisals are meaningful for a relative
approach, since it is impossible for details to be estab-
lished before relative tests take place. A greater estima-
tion in these predictions (including deviations) could help
the required total amount that the buyer would owe for
acquiring the system.
The introductory memorandum is then submitted to the
Supreme Council of Navy for approval. This Council carries
the authority to make changes, improvements in the variety
of the requirements, or to reduce these factors, having in
mind the needs, interests, and benefits for the Country.
Approval of this Council constitutes the submission of the
IM to the KYSEA via GEETHA/SAGI and DEM, in order for the
program to proceed into the next stage. Figure 9.4 shows
the procedures until the decision point 2.
C. STAGE 3, EVALUATION OF BIDDING-OPERATIONAL DESCRIPTION
DECISION POINT 3
This stage includes a wide spectrum of activities. Some
of them take place domesticly concurrently with the foreign
industries. Critical considerations have to be made starting
from the description of specific operational requirements.
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work for the establishment of the actions chain, including
Technical/Operational Requirements Descriptions and Requests
for Proposals.
1 • Technical/Op erational R equir ements Descr iptions
Since the approval of the Governmental Council of
National Defense has been given, the program can enter into
the most critical stage. Teams of expert Officers and knowl-
edgeable civilians prepare a first description of the
required technical specifications. The PM coordinates these
teams and carries the final responsibility for the execution
of this process. Experience frcm other similar major weapon
systems can be applied to the fulfillment of this step.
Additional information can support the expert opinions.
Technical manuals (if available) can nelp in the final
break-dcwn of all the necessary details. Another team is
constructed to describe the specifications in the area of
Logistics support. A third team is for the establishment of
mechanical requirements and so en. The operational capabil-
ities on the other side are strictly related to the tech-
nical specifications. These capabilities relate to the
mission for which the system is required. There will also
be a description of preferred systems and subsystems and a
closer designation of the cost and life cycle cost consider-
ations.
2 • Inquest for Proposals { RP)
The above responsibility rests upon the Contracting
Officer. He works in parallel with the PM, carrying the
responsibilities as these are described in the above section
A. In this specific stage he has the authority to search
international and domestic industry to acquire a first
appraisal of the possible offerers for the specific major
system. He may construct a list of the firms. Since these
120
actions relate to the law and legislative documentation, he
has to be an Officer of the E 1 branch of the GEN carrying
the indispensable knowledge surrounding the broad area of
the laws, decrees, methods, and instructions. Working with
his team the CO prepares the RP and sends them to the inter-
ested parties. The solicitaticn of the bids are evaluated
subject to such criteria such as cost, performance, and the
time to be acquired. As it was described in chapter VII,
section B, pertaining to the procedure for unsealing and
evaluating the bids, the specific committee may agree to
accept bids containing unimportant deviations from the terms
of the agreement. So the acceptance of the bids depends on
the Committee's discretion, given decision responsibility
established for the CO. He also estimates the necessary
level of the budget that will be required for the completion
of the whole program. Both of them, the budget and accept-
ance have to include an inherent flexibility that allows a
closed approach to the considered need.
The completion of these specifications needs the
cooperation of all teams. Under the supervision of the PM
supported by the CO, the members collaborate in order to
prepare compromise written descriptions. The result is a
finished set of required Technical and Operational
Requirements Descriptions (TSORE) and an evaluation of the
bids of the offerers.
The Introductory Memorandum is submitted to the
KYSEA via the A/GEN attached to the work done by the teams.
Approval of the governmental council gives the "green light"
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D. STAGE 4, NEGOTIATIONS
DECISION POINT 4
Actions until this stage include general and specific
details inherent in the required system. Stage 4 is focused
on major considerations rather than on analysing complex
conditions surrounding the new ship. The PM, the CO, and the
consultants working with them make a first approach to
clarify the international market, the behavior of the manu-
facturers, and the proportion that they can achieve in
reaching the concrete need. The above considerations result
from a sequence of negotiations. At this point the evalua-
tion of the bids has been done and consequently efforts are
directed toward estimating the cost, schedule, performance,
method of payment and all the factors as they are listed
thereinafter.
1 . Cost-Schedul e-P erformance-Observations
The bids are narrowed to those that approach the
cost and the optimum operational requirements, so the CO has
to negotiate with the interested parties. Subjects of these
negotiations may be details about the cost arising from the
construction of the new unit. The Committee of Cost
Estimation (COCE) , similar to the Cost Acquisition
Improvement Group existing in the U.S. Navy, becomes respon-
sible for this part of the whole program, reporting to the
PH. Inflation rates in the manufacturer's country, political
stability, labor unions, and intergovernmental relationships
have to be measured by the buyer. There are potential
reasons for little progress in the program, and delay in its
acceptance, which imply increases in the above factors
(cost, schedule) . Later on these deficiencies may result in
the weapon system performance reduction. The buyer wishes to
acquire the system in the proper time from the proper
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contractor and subcontractors, defalcaf ications known or
unknown in the industrial market cause losses in the buying
power. Therefore the party that requires the system has to
be flexible. Any given indemnification from the manufacturer
does not solve the time constraints. The technology is
growing rapidly and the updated new system may become
obsolet as a whole unit or in part. Also it is possible that
restrictions may be involved in the whole procedure due to
the law. The CO's action of negotiating the cost is similar
to the procedure followed by the U.S. Navy Best and Final
Offer.
2 . Method of Paymen
t
The method of payment and the required installments
are also under negotiation. The country having limited
resources has to negotiate the exact amount of payment other
than the net exchange. The international trade-offs estab-
lish different ways to pay its obligations. Economies in the
growing stage may not have the flexibility to make full
payment in a specific currency.
3 • Visits to Labs and Plan t
The visits to the manufacturer's base carry the
responsibility for the visitors to acquire a first appraisal
of the industry that represents a possible offerer rather
than to inspect the bidder. The same concept is sought by
the observation of the labs and the whole shipyard and the
equipments. The PM monitors the above actions supported by
expert and essential personnel. He has to examine conditions
that could generate problems as far as the industrial capa-
bility of the shipbuilder's plant. Any unusual existing
situations have to be taken into account because they may
create critical problems in the selection of this or another
shipyard. In this way the configuration of the proper
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shipbuilder would be established and the confirmation of his
production readiness could be verified. Technical documents
are validated, the mission area analysis is updated, and the
logistics support planning is completed. 3oth the PM and the
CO reevaluate the risk involved in their final decision as
to where they can obtain the system being under
construction.
4 . Work Forces
Work forces, work packages, and pre- planed work
organization must be developed by the PH. The work forces
refer to the responsibility of the PM to select the appro-
priate personnel and the supervisors for the purpose of
carrying on efficiently and effectively. Since there is a
distinction between 'doing right things' and 'doing the
things right* the selected staff is supposed to be knowl-
edgeable and, if possible, have previous experience. The
cost account manager responsible for the work packages (tiny
works representing lower levels) must be assigned in order
to become familiar with the sutject with which he will be
involved. The cost performance report represents a tool for
the PM to manage and this can re developed by the planning
packages (comprehensive packages of work packages). The
officer or civilian PM depends on the work forces, under him
and their backgrounds. The preferable organizational struc-
ture for these forces to be selected from the matrix, func-
tional, and coordinative is the first one (author's
perception). The establishment of this structure implies
advantages such as using efficiently the workers and the
employees, flexibility of the work's change, easy set-up,
synergistic environment, and finally it is not terribly
expensive. Generally speaking, the PM has to organize his
"headquarter" in such a way as for everybody to know who is
responsible for what and to what degree.
12 5
So far, the establishment of some major considera-
tions have been developed from both the buyer's and the
manufacturer's point of view. Cost, performance, schedule,
and operational capabilities have been defined according to
the relative requirements. Alsc, procedures for bid evalua-
tion resulted in the isolation of the specific manufacturer
who wants and is capable of constructing the system.
Support items, special tools, and equipments are refined.
The PM created a pre-planed organization structure for the
necessary working personnel. The remaining part covers the
final stage. Before the program enters into the last stage,
a major decision is needed. The KYSEA has been involved in
all the decisions until this point, because its members are
ministers of critical ministries, so they can appraise more
precisely the coordination of the various impacts of a major
decision. Likewise the final decision in this point has to
be given by the KYSEA, as figure 9.6 indicates.
E. STAGE 5, SHIPBUILDING
After the final approval, the A/GEN monitors everything
related to the program. He has a direct communication with
the PM and CO. They also may report to the A/GEN via the
director of the C* branch of the GEN. Duties and responsi-
bilities carried by the PM include limited production for
operational use and tests surrcunfling the operational suit-
ability. The logistics support is finalized through the
gradually acquired experience and the monitoring of quality.
Any inefficiences coming to the PM are resolved and modifi-
cations that have to be made are proposed to the manufac-
turer in order to have a common agreement as far as the
upcoming costs and schedule changes. The final product (new
unit) is provided to the fleet cr another command to proceed
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X- CO NC^S 10 NS^RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Each program recommended bv the Greek Navy probably is
going to be approved by the Government. On the other side
the contractors do not hesitate to express their optimism
about the performance of the program related to the system.
The military officers who are assigned to manage a program
may not have experience to negotiate with the manufacturer
in comparison with the industrial contractors, but they feel
that their duties are tied to the country's interests. The
main objective of every non public organization remains
profit. So the commanding officer's responsibility is
doubled since he and the teams under his command have to
understand the overall construction of the ship and, simul-
taneously, the workings of the private sector.
It has been noted that in the country's history many
political and strategic changes have been made. These
changes also had effects in the economic, social, military,
and regional fields. Also an attempt was made to provide a
distinction between the two systems of the Greek Navy and
the U.S. Navy concerning procedures, rules, and instructions
for the acquisition of major weapon systems.
The author's perception is that the existing similari-
ties and differences depend first on the different environ-
ments under which each system operates and secondly on the
general rules followed by each Navy. Any deficiencies
pointed out in the existing procedures in the Greek Navy are
the result of the lack of the industrial base to accept such
orders. Additionally this lack seems to be more subjective
than objective. The structural concept in these industries
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exists. Motivations necessary to exclude this lack will be
described for the benefit of both the Navy and the ship-
builders.
B. DEFICIENCIES AND PROPOSALS
• Stages: There is no clear distinction between the
various phases that constitute the construction of a
major system. However, the sequence of the steps that
are involved are well known. Expert officers having
more knowledge and less experience have been involved
from time to time in a variety of shipbuildings.
• Proposal; The implementation of exact and specific
stages could be established. Each stage as it is indi-
cated in relative figures should include detailed
descriptions of the responsibilities, schedules and
costs. Expected benefits are the detailed schedule of
time required isolation of responsibilities, motivation
for productivity and possible reward, and increased
cooperation. From the manufacturer's point of view the
impacts could be a reduction in cost, increased profit,
and elimination of the variable overhead.
• EP.£k £2££es: At the present time the responsibility
for the structure of the workers and employees rests
upon the manufacturer. The Navy makes observations
about the progress of the program. The commander of the
mission makes reports to the GEN as described in
section E, chapter 71.
• Proposal: A matrix organization should be established.
Specific professions should cooperate. This fact would
lead to a specific and detailed description of the
advanced requirements involved in ship construction,
lack of personnel in a position could be completed by a
similar team working in the same project. Wasted time
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and increases in cost could be avoided, and a syner-
gistic environment could be created.
• Planning Packages-Cost Reduction: This process is well
defined whenever repairs are made by the Navy's
employees. The existence cf the specific work schedule
carries the responsibility to follow-up this schedule.
But the cost is not clearly defined and in some cases
may exceed the budget for the reguired overhaul.
• Proposal: A work budget and schedule integration
scheme can be established. The duties of this office
are the definition of the work to be performed, the
schedule of the activities and the particular jobs, and
the allocation of the existing resources. The existence
of a Cost Account Manager is a necessity, because in
this way the small projects can be carried out effec-
tively. That is why any ship-wide problems are based
originally in these lower levels of the work. Expected
benefit can be the description of both the schedule
variance and the cost variance. The first one repre-
sents the difference between the budgeted cost of work
performed and the budgeted cost of work scheduled. The
second one is the result by subtracting the actual cost
of work performed from the budgeted cost of work
performed. It seems that considerations and major deci-
sions based on the above variations could lead to a
substantial reduction in expenditures.
• Industry: The Greek industry has to become more
capable in order that major weapon systems may be
acquired from these domestic organizations. At the
present time, this capability exists only occasionally.
• P£2£2§al: T he government could establishe criteria to
attract investment capital to the domestic shipbuilding
industry. It has to be noticed that the legislative
decree 2687/1953 applies rules and methods for
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investing and protecting the foreign capital. Recently,
this decree has been strengthened by the article 107 of
the country's Constitution of 1975 [Ref. 32].
a. Offset Benefits
The Greek Navy, and generally the Arced Forces,
can establish the method of "offset benefits". That is the
amount of economic and technological benefits that the
offerer manufacturer nay provide to the buyer as a counter-
balance of the specific commission given to him. At the
present time the industry needs the transfer of advanced
technology from abroad. Anticipated benefits are: training,
specifications, test instruments, special tools, and gener-
ally the know how. The expansion of this method to the
defense field is thoroughly supported by many countries.
b. Co-production
The co-production, being a part of an offset
program, implies that the party can be concurrently buyer
and subcontractor. The country can construct parts of the
main unit. In this way the anticipated benefit is the
gradual exploration of technology base programs that also
represent for further expansion of the industry's capa-
bility.
c. Negotiator
The Greek Navy's contracting department carries
out its responsibility by evaluating the upcoming conditions
based on the Navy's interests. The key player before the
assignment of the contract, the negotiator, is led by his
experience rather than by a scientific education [Ref. 34].
Tactics in this field are used by both the Navy and the
manufacturer. The negotiators of the private sector are
mostly professionals. It is in the Navy's interest to
acquire the same professionals.
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d. Warm Production Base
In some cases the production rate may be less
than the required optimum one. But this inefficiency does
not mean that the Navy invests "lost" money in these indus-
tries. It is may be preferable for small quantities to be
acquired from the industries rather than large quantities at
a quick rate. The expected benefit is a warm production
base.
e. Capital Incentives
Incentive and reward fees designed from the
manufacturer's point of view appear to be an effective moti-
vator. This incentive can lead the manufacturer to increase
productivity, improve the quality of the system, and to
reduce the duration of the whole program without altering
the required capabilities of the ship under construction.
f. Small Companies
The protection of small companies could be a
factor for exploiting their resources and for protecting all
the companies. An office coald be established to authorize
the provision of weapon systems in companies with a limited
number of employees. Similar conditions exist in U.S. Navy
where the Small Business Office (NAVSEA 00K 5N18/3) author-
izes the provision of weapon systems contracts to companies
with less than 1000 employees.
g. Program Manager
Purposely the idea cf the PM has been left as a
final proposal. Many details have been included in this
research about his duties and responsibilities. The author's
perception is that instead of discussing this concept it
would be preferable to mention the thoughts of R. McNamara
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who summarized the PM's responsibilities by stating, "I want
to look to a point of central control and information in the
form of a program manager for each major weapon system. He
shall be rewarded in his career for prompt and analytical
disclosure of his problems as well as for his successes.
This is a key position in our military departments,
demanding the best managerial talents on which I want to
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